JEAN-LUC PEPIN

"The crisis of international cooperation and organization" Personal summary of the Political background to the work of the Trilateral Commission.

When not attributed, the quotations are from the DuchesneDuchêne — Mushakoji — Owen paper. Other quotes were taken from the New York and Tokyo meetings.)

Main theme: the "global interdependence" of countries of the world — not a new phenomenon, but at "a new scale," becoming a "new normalcy."

That global interdependence creates the need for "a global community," which itself calls for a "revision of the world political system" leading to more common (collective) management of common interests. We're not moving fast and consciously enough towards that objective. In comparison to today's world, the post II World War period was almost a "belle époque". There was then a sense of the reauirements of social security, an economic thrust, more responsible leadership (re world peace). Public opinion was "low pressured". "Pax Americana" and the fear of the "common enemy" kept countries disciplined. "Behind collective appearances the postwar system was one of relative isolation".

The changing world:

"from a bipolar to a multipolar world" (in the management of the problems of "central balance"). In both defence and economic matters,

Rise of USSR. Return of China. Economic progress of EEC and Japan. Break between USSR and China, etc.

Decline of Pax Americana and of US economic leadership — with end of war in Vietnam, detente with USSR and China, East-West conference on security, FRG accommodations with USSR and others.

Balance of payments and exchange rates problems in USA. "The practice of world power has cooled the American crusading ardor." "The U.S. now behaves more like one of several power structures," like "an ordinary member of the system."

The Nixon doctrine: disengagement; request for burden sharing; greater recognition of economic rights of other nations, larger roles for Western Europe and Japan.

Deterioration of multilateralism. "Individual countries and blocs (now) feel freer to pursue narrower perceptions of their interests" (Brzezinski) "Fragmentation, protectionism and inward-looking self-sufficiency". Some return to unilateral action and "instinctive bilateralism."

Economic and political institutions have not yet adjusted to these changes, they are still a l'heure of the cold war (Whitman). "Once the U.S. ceases to act as the patron power providing the lubrication, the system must either be reformed or founder in a recrudescence of nationalism."

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the "new perils" — "the frictions of interdependence."

arising from domestic affairs:

"the acceleration of the industrial revolution" leads to problems of "growing social aspirations," ("the way people think has changed more rapidly in the 20th century than the way they live" — Brzezinski), of government interventionism, of demand on resources, of inflation, of unemployment, of pollution, of capital movements, of behavior of multinational corporations, of desirable "rated of productive growth," etc., all requiring domestic decisions, all offering possible "conflicts of domestic priorities," all affecting other countries.
Danger of inward lookingness or of "regressive international atmosphere." ..."Divisive potential of such issues, for example between the industrial powers anxious to reduce "pollution" and the pre-industrial ones anxious to produce more."

from external affairs:

New sources of conflict added to nuclear threat (held by "the balance of nuclear prudence"): "from oil to fisheries, from spaces to oceans," energy, trade, monetary system, transfer of technology, "widening disparities in economic conditions," communications, etc.
"East-West" (development) problems, "North-South" (poverty) problems, "inner" (among advanced industrialized countries) problems.
More recently "the problems of scarcity added to the problems of abundance"; "shortages in world resources could breed new rivalries" (statement of purposes).
"Shocks will be transmitted...with great intensity and lightning speed."

some new "positives":

  • detente...between the two super powers;
  • efforts to liberalize trade — EEC and Japan efforts, USA trade reform bill, GATT meeting:
  • some stabilization in monetary crisis and acceptance of "monetary innovation as a long-term goal";
  • "trade unionism developing among the less developed countries".

The challenge: "to adjust the frame to the new conditions" to organize the management of interdependence "now that ideological conflicts are waned."

Wanted:

  • A "vision of goals", "a positive awareness of the general interest."
  • "Changes in the structures of decision making."
  • "New levels of control and self rend="unspaced" control, e.g. on "private transnational actions," on regional policies, on transfer of capital, on sharing of markets, etc.
  • "Self education and collective education," "to generate the joint perspectives."
    • — 3 —
  • "Government accountability"to its own citizens and to the world community.
  • "Beyond aid to cooperation" with LDC's ("the guilty conscience of the rich").
  • "A managed international monetary system"; "with sufficient flexibility."
  • "Formalize consultation between governments."
  • "A continuous framework," "permanent procedures," "new forms of common management," "a framework of collective action conducive to peace."
  • "A consensus" is needed on that — "a search for new political perspectives on major international issues," in fear of returning to "spheres of influence and political conflict all round."

Ojectives not easy to reach: e.g.

  • "the differences between the centrally-planned and market economies are so great that any process towards common management will be slow and experimental."
  • "some of the pre-industrial countries are acquiring massive bargaining power against the industrial ones."
  • "today, political and public opinions are overwhelmingly aware only of the national initiatives and legitimacies."

Challenge not being faced:

"The political will to manage common problems collectively is once more falling behind needs."

The "trilateral" approach:

the raison d'être:

  • "Trilateralism" is not a replacement of multi-lateralism; it is one other way of reaching objectives.
  • Interdependence might be easier to organize between the industrialized countries of the three geographic areas ( North America, Western Europe, Japan) ("the moremost industrialized democratic trading nations" — Reischauer).
  • These countries have special capacities and responsibilities to the world (2/3 of world annual income) (75% of world trade).
  • "The problems of money, trade, investment, resource and peace cannot be creatively tackled unless they cooperate. This Could be dramatically evident if they failed."
  • Importance of strengthening Europe-Japan relations. "Trilaterism acknowledges the co-equality of Japan." (Smith)
  • Need to "multilaterialize their approach to the developing countries both as a precaution against potential disruptions in the international system and as an effective response to an urgent moral necessity."

Yet in recent years, relations between the 3 "regions" have been subject to severe strains.

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The Commission:

role:

  • It must explore philosophies, procedures, techniques, attitudes of interdependence.
  • It must not be "a drastic structure." (Owen)
  • It must "generate the will," "promote the habit;" "devise and disseminate proposals" (statement of purposes).
  • It represents the role of the private sector in "developing international communications of ideas and objectives" (Mushakoji), in "consensus development" (Smith). "Leadership in such matters cannot be limited to politicians and bureaucrats." "It is important to educate leaders and for leaderto educate themselves." (Ms. Anderson)

work contemplated:

  • It must tackle the important and difficult problems of our times "otherwise we will lose whatever audience we might have reached." (Pepin).
  • "It will consider studies and publish policy papers which reflect its members' views on...money, trade, multinational corporations, resources, the seas, relations with LDC and with centrally planned societies, policies of advanced technology, changes in values, etc. "To define the nature of problems and formulate policies" (see "The Trilateral Policy Program," Sept. 18, 1973); matters of urgency, longer term task forces, studies in depth.
  • The Commission will present: joint analysis of problem, proposals for practical solutions, efforts to secure public and government support.

the difficulties ahead for the Commission. Many, among which:

Differences among countries of the "regions": e.g.

  • different psychology on debating styles and action expected. "We have to be very prudent not to antagonize each other, third countries and other Japanese political parties." (Japanese speakers). "We are not government representatives, which gives us more freedom." (Zulueta).
  • Different perspectives on "security" — Europeans are for inclusion and Japanese against. "Even if the security system is not trilateral, there is more to security than defence, e.g. commodities." (Lambsdorff) "Views on security of a general political nature cannot be ignored." (Kohnstamm)
  • There will be conflicts between sunernational and international concepts of common management. (Pepin)

the apparent contradiction between "global interdependence" and "trilateralism."

  • It's not a question of opposing trilateralism and bilateralism or globalism, it's a question of accentuating the benefits of trilateralism. "Let's not be ashamed of it." (Eyskens) "Trilateral cooperation paves the way for cooperation in a wider framework."
  • Trilateralism may be defined by non-trilaterals as the rich man's club. Let's not be oversensitive to the comment and more sensitive to the need of working with the LDC's.
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the "constituency" of the Commission. Whom does it advise: the government? the public? or both? and how: "study oriented" or "action oriented" responses?

"To make it easier, by influencing public opinion, for politicians to agree among themselves!" (Pepin)

"Let's articulate some general notions about broad patterns of behaviour for governments." (Brzezinski).

"to inform the publics and governments concerned about pertinent conclusions and recommendations." (Policy program).

other preoccupations: (Pepin)

  • danger of "the beautification of the past"...
  • danger of not appearing to recognize the creativity of conflicts...
  • ...and the relativity or ambivalence of many concepts and institutions, e.g. multinationals. The opposites (e.g. detente and nationalism) often both create problems.
  • difficulty of reconciling humility of approach and visible enthusiasm for the objective of the Commission.
  • the particular situation of Canada in the Commission. Our suggested formula re country membership: "Japan and the countries of Western Europe and North America." But the Western Europeans want to be identified as such...Recognized validity and usefulness of Canadian participation both as separate entity and as part of North America.

the first steps

the political background paper and the statement of purposes:

  • recommendations to government:
    • "consult and cooperate,"
    • "refrain from unilateral actions,"
    • "take advantage of existing international and regional organizations".
  • reference to need for European unity and for better Europe — Japan relations.

the monetary reform paper and the future recommendations.